When a Survivor Asks to Withdraw: The Court’s Protective Role in Intimate Partner Violence Cases

What happens when a person who has obtained a restraining order asks the court to remove it because they want to reconcile?

A November 17, 2026 decision of Justice Daurio of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice illustrates why that request does not necessarily end the court’s inquiry. Where the evidence continues to raise concerns about a survivor’s safety, the court may maintain protective orders and require updated evidence before deciding whether to lift them.

The decision also directly rejects the suggestion that returning to a relationship, permitting contact or failing to call police means a person cannot be afraid of their partner.

The request to withdraw

The mother had obtained urgent parenting orders, a restraining order and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home on October 23, 2026. At the return hearing, the court was advised that she wished to withdraw her motion, terminate the restraining order and reconcile with the father.

The father sought more than $14,000 in costs. The hearing initially addressed costs and whether the motion should be dismissed with prejudice.

Justice Daurio’s inquiry went further: was it appropriate to remove the protections already in place?

The court had evidence of violence that the father did not dispute. That included past physical violence, police involvement and charges, an incident in which he emptied cupboards and wardrobes in front of the children, and interference with the mother’s access to her supplementary credit card. The court found that his attempt to characterize the cupboard and wardrobe incident as neither abusive nor threatening showed a lack of insight, particularly given the history of assault. His later restoration of credit card access did not make the earlier interference irrelevant. (Endorsement, paras. 21–25.)

Returning to a relationship does not disprove fear

The father relied on the mother’s conduct to challenge her claim that she was afraid. Among other things, he pointed to her return to the relationship, her consent to contact despite a peace bond, and occasions when she had not contacted police.

Justice Daurio rejected that reasoning:

“The Court must not rely on such stereotypes in its review of the evidence.”

The court identified these arguments as relying on stereotypes about how a victim of violence is expected to behave. (Para. 22.)

That finding matters. A survivor’s decision to resume a relationship does not, by itself, establish that earlier violence did not occur or that the risk has disappeared. Nor does a failure to report every incident to police establish an absence of fear. The court must examine the evidence of violence and risk rather than measure the survivor against an assumed standard of behaviour.

The court also refused to shift responsibility for the father’s conduct onto the mother. Allegations that she had provoked him did not excuse his behaviour. Justice Daurio made clear that he remained fully responsible for his own actions. (Para. 26.)

Respecting autonomy while addressing safety

The decision expressly acknowledged the difficulty of maintaining protective orders when the person they protect asks to remove them.

Justice Daurio recognized that declining the mother’s request could be viewed as paternalistic. However, the court had no updated evidence from her explaining why she had changed her mind, and the father’s evidence reinforced the court’s concerns. The endorsement also recorded that the earlier procedural order had prohibited a reply affidavit. (Paras. 9, 28.)

The court did not make a finding that the mother had been coerced into withdrawing. It did not finally determine every disputed allegation. Instead, it concluded that the evidence before it did not justify terminating the restraining order or setting aside exclusive possession at that time.

This distinction is essential. The decision does not establish that courts should routinely override survivors’ wishes. It shows why a request to remove protection may require further evidence when the existing record continues to raise serious safety concerns.

Maintaining protection and judicial oversight

Justice Daurio continued the restraining order and exclusive possession order, adjourned the motion, and directed that the matter return before her with updated evidence.

The adjournment was intended to give both parties an opportunity to obtain professional support. The court identified different needs: support for the father in managing his behaviour, and support for the mother from a professional experienced in working with people who have been subjected to trauma. (Paras. 27–29.)

The father’s request for costs was not granted. The court found that costs were inappropriate in the circumstances. (Para. 30.)

The court also addressed parenting separately. It found insufficient evidence to support the father’s proposed shared parenting arrangement but expanded his parenting time. Any additional agreed parenting time was to be arranged through counsel and comply with the restraining order. The resulting order was temporary and without prejudice.

That approach preserved protection while allowing the court to reconsider the family’s circumstances on a fuller record.

What this means for families experiencing IPV

Under section 16 of the Divorce Act, a child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being receive primary consideration in parenting decisions. Courts must consider family violence, including children’s direct or indirect exposure to it, and its implications for parenting arrangements.

Justice Daurio’s decision illustrates the practical importance of that scrutiny. A wish to reconcile did not resolve the court’s concerns about violence, vulnerability or the adequacy of the evidence. Nor did it justify treating the request for protection as unfounded.

For a survivor considering reconciliation, the distinction is important: wanting the relationship to continue does not erase the violence that led them to seek help. In this case, the court kept protections in place, allowed time for professional support, and required updated evidence before deciding what should happen next.

Decision discussed: Justice Daurio’s endorsement dated November 17, 2026, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Court File No. FC-26-1868-00. Amanda Taerk and Alexandra Faircloth of Taerk Family Law represented the applicant.